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Financial soundness in the household sector matters for financial 
stability and for the real economy. The level of household debt in 
Korea raises concern about the financial soundness of the household 
sector due to its size, growth rate and quality. Against this backdrop, 
we assess the financial vulnerability of borrowers based on an 
analysis of credit bureau (CB) data, in which the actual credit 
activities of most individuals are recorded at a high frequency in 
Korea. We construct over-indebtedness indicators from the CB data 
and then assess the predictability of forthcoming defaults. Based on 
the over-indebtedness indicators, we show how borrowers are 
distributed in terms of over-indebtedness and how the over-indebted 
differ from average borrowers in terms of their characteristics. 
Furthermore, we show how the aggregate credit risk in the household 
sector would change under macroeconomic distress by analyzing how 
each borrower’s credit quality would be affected by adverse shocks. 
The findings of this paper may contribute to assessing household debt 
vulnerability and to enhancing regulatory and supervisory practices 
for financial stability. 
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I. Introduction 
 
inancial soundness in the household sector matters for financial stability as well 
as for the real economy. The global financial crisis of 2007-09 has shown how 
the financial soundness of the household sector can affect both the financial system 
and the real economy. The level of household debt in Korea raises concern over 
financial stability due to its large size, high growth rate and compositional quality. 
The amount of household debt relative to GDP (or income) is large compared to 
those of OECD countries, as shown in Figure 1. Household debt has been growing 
faster than household income, suggesting that the debt-repayment ability of 
households has weakened. Furthermore, the share of loans with high-interest rates 
from non-bank financial institutions has increased rapidly, as shown in Figure 2,  
 
 
FIGURE 1. HOUSEHOLD DEBT: CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
Source: OECD, Euro Stat., FRED (2012). 
 
 
FIGURE 2. HOUSEHOLD DEBT BY FINANCIAL SECTOR: BANK VS. NON-BANK 
Note: Non-bank financial institutions in the figure include nonbank depository institutions and other 
financial institutions such as insurance companies, pension funds and public financial institutions. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
F 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 38 NO. 3         Household Over-indebtedness and Financial Vulnerability in Korea  55 
while the share of balloon-payment loans is relatively large as well. In short, these 
phenomena give rise to concerns about household debt vulnerability. Against this 
backdrop, we investigate household over-indebtedness and its associated financial 
vulnerability based on an analysis of credit bureau (CB) data, which contain the 
actual credit activities of most individuals in Korea. 
The vulnerability of household debt at the aggregate level may be determined by 
how much debt is held by the overly indebted with weak repayment abilities. In 
other words, the larger the amount of debt held by borrowers bearing high credit 
risks, the larger the share of debt that could be vulnerable. In order to evaluate this 
issue, we need criteria by which to assess which debtors are exposed to higher 
credit risks. The current study constructs several common indicators of over-
indebtedness from the CB data and assesses the predictability of forthcoming 
defaults. The CB data employed in this study cover most individuals in Korea and 
contain their actual credit activities, including the amount of debt and debt services, 
the types of debt contracts and lending institutions used, delinquencies, their credit 
score, and more. In order to understand who the overly indebted are, we identify 
them using over-indebtedness indicators and characterize the vulnerable indebted 
in comparison with average borrowers. Furthermore, we show how both the 
distribution of borrowers in terms of the credit score dimension and the aggregate 
default risk would be affected by sudden changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. 
The concept of over-indebtedness may be ambiguous. Hence, it may not be easy 
to define what it means in practice – see Betti, Dourmashkin, Rossi, and Yin (2007) 
and D’Alessio and Lezzi (2013) for discussions. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable 
to relate the concept to a condition of difficulty in debt repayment. Over-
indebtedness indicators can be assessed and compared with one another with 
regard to their ability to predict defaults in the forthcoming year. We examine 
common over-indebtedness indicators - such as the credit score, debt service ratio 
(DSR), the DSR of unsecured debt holders, the loan to income (LTI) ratio, and the 
number of credit commitments – in terms of their performance as predictors of 
defaults. We show that the credit score is a dominant predictor of defaults, while 
the number of credit commitments may have some additional explanatory power 
for forthcoming defaults. The DSR may have weak predictability of defaults in the 
forthcoming year, though it loses its explanatory power if the credit score and the 
number of credit commitments are controlled. 
Based on the over-indebtedness indicators, vulnerable borrowers can be 
identified and analyzed. We document the characteristics of the over-indebted to 
shed some light on who they are and how they differ from average borrowers in 
several dimensions. Based on such primary indicators as the credit score, the 
number of credit commitments, and the DSR, the overly indebted are characterized. 
We show that most over-indebtedness indicators recount common characteristics of 
the over-indebted. For instance, all over-indebtedness indicators show that over-
indebted borrowers tend to depend heavily on non-bank financial institutions as the 
sources of their loans. In addition, those classified as overly indebted in terms of 
one indicator tend to be classified as overly indebted by other indicators as well. 
However, different indicators appear to elucidate idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
over-indebted. For example, the over-indebted with poor credit scores tend to  
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show lower DSRs than average, while the over-indebted with multiple credit 
commitments show much higher DSRs than average. Thus, caution may be needed 
when using those indicators for purposes of risk monitoring or supervision.  
We are often asked about how the share of borrowers at risk would be affected 
by a sudden change in the macroeconomic environment (e.g., GDP, interest rates, 
asset prices). The over-indebtedness indicators can be used to assess borrowers’ 
credit risks at the individual as well as at the aggregate level by relating them to 
default probabilities. The stress test conducted in the current study may guide us to 
assess the financial vulnerability of the indebted at the aggregate level due to 
macroeconomic distress. In the current study based on CB data, we show how 
macroeconomic distress would affect the credit quality of borrowers as well as the 
aggregate default rates in household credit markets. If the historical scenarios of 
past financial crises such as the Asian financial crisis (’97~99) and the global 
financial crisis (’07~09) were assumed to reoccur, the aggregate default risk would 
then increase dramatically, with the larger impact resulting from the stress scenario 
of the Asian financial crisis, the worse macroeconomic condition. It should be 
noted that the stress test proposed in the current study shows uniquely how each 
borrower’s credit quality would deteriorate under macroeconomic distress, which 
in turn would change the aggregate default risk. 
It is also important to note that the current study analyzes CB data, whereas 
many previous studies of household debt vulnerability used household survey data. 
The survey data are subject to certain limitations in their assessments of financial 
vulnerability in spite of their strengths regarding various kinds of information 
about household characteristics and activities, as they are subject to errors and 
psychological biases and use insufficient representations of their populations 
(Lusardi and Tufano 2009; Karlan and Zinman 2008; Zinman 2009).1 The CB data 
employed in the current study cover most individuals and financial institutions in 
Korea and contain their actual credit activities at a high frequency, with the 
information used by financial institutions during their loan generation processes. 
Thus, the CB data may provide an advantage when assessing and monitoring the 
levels of actual credit risk for the purpose of financial regulation and supervision 
relative to the household survey data. For instance, we can assess the over-
indebtedness indicators for their predictability of forthcoming defaults because the 
CB data keep track of defaults on loans, whereas the survey data provide 
insufficient information on default events.  
In order to assess and monitor the financial vulnerability of household debt, 
which may be important for prudential regulation and supervision, we often rely on 
stress tests that assume extremely adverse macroeconomic conditions. The stress 
test proposed in the current study is distinct from those in previous studies in terms 
of the intermediary mechanism through which macroeconomic shocks affect the 
aggregate credit risk of household debt. First, we use the credit score, a dominant 
predictor of forthcoming defaults, as a part of an intermediary channel through 
which macroeconomic distress affects the aggregate credit risk. Second, we shed 
some light on how the relationship between the over-indebtedness indicator and 
 
1In addition, the CB data are updated at a higher frequency, up to the most recent period, in contrast to the 
survey data; hence, this data may be a useful source of information for risk monitoring and supervisory practices. 
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default rates would be affected by macroeconomic fluctuations. It should be noted 
that the relationship between over-indebtedness measures and default rates are not 
constant but may change as macroeconomic conditions fluctuate. For instance, the 
default rates jumped dramatically for borrowers even with constant debt servicing 
burdens during the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (Kim and Byun 2012). These 
distinct features of the stress test proposed in the current study may contribute to 
enhancing the assessments and monitoring of the aggregate credit risk emerging 
from household debt. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following order. Previous studies 
are reviewed in relation to the current study in section II. Data and descriptive 
statistics are shown in section III. Indicators of over-indebtedness are presented and 
assessed for their ability to predict defaults in the near term future in section IV. 
Based on the preceding analysis, the characteristics of the over-indebted are 
discussed in section V. Stress tests are then conducted to assess the financial 
vulnerability of the indebted against macroeconomic distress in section VI. 
Concluding remarks are made in section VII. 
 
II. Relation to Previous Studies 
 
The current study assesses the financial soundness of the household sector by 
analyzing CB data based on measures of over-indebtedness and a stress test, 
motivated by the rising level of concern over financial stability. This issue has 
received a great amount of attraction from central banks and financial supervisory 
bodies since the global financial crisis in 2007-09, leading to regular and irregular 
assessments of the household sector from the perspective of financial stability. 
Nonetheless, there is still room to improve the tools and related databases. Our 
approach with regard to this issue is to assess household sector credit risk at the 
aggregate level from an analysis of microeconomic data, as this dataset suitably 
represents the population and is updated at a high frequency. As argued by Mian 
and Sufi (2010), an analysis of such microeconomic data can shed some light on 
household liability issues and provide guidance to policymakers.  
Household debt, the liability side of the household sector, has been somewhat 
neglected in the literature compared to the asset side of the balance sheet (Zinman 
2015). As noted by Zinman (2015), “the neglect of household debt is pronounced 
relative to its cousin literatures on corporate debt.” Concerning the credit risk 
assessment of interest in the current study, we find a large volume of literature on 
corporate debt, whereas there is much less to be found on household debt. For 
example, we address how macroeconomic conditions would affect the credit 
quality of borrowers by showing how the obligors would migrate in the dimension 
of credit ratings. With regard to this question, we find much work on corporate debt 
in the literature (e.g., Trück 2008; Koopman et al. 2009; Bangia et al. 2002; 
Carling et al. 2007; Bonfim 2009; Altman and Rijken 2004), whereas we find few 
similar works on household debt in spite of the rising demand from policy circles 
to our knowledge. This situation may have arisen because credit risk assessment in 
the household sector had not received much attention until its importance was 
recognized in the face of the historically unprecedented large debt accumulation 
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followed by the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-09, while microeconomic data 
such as CB data have only become available in the recent years. Against this 
backdrop, we aim to contribute to the assessment of financial stress in the 
household sector. 
The global financial crisis provided a critical moment for extensive reforms on 
financial regulation and supervision with an emphasis on macro-prudential policies 
(Galati and Moessner 2013; IMF 2011a; IMF 2011b; FSB, IMF, and BIS 2011;  
Lim et al. 2011; Bernanke 2011). An important element for effective financial 
supervision is to monitor and to assess emerging risks in the financial system in 
relation to the real economy. It should be noted that the most frequently used 
macro-prudential instruments in practice have been caps on LTV and DTI ratios 
that are aimed at borrowers from the household sector among the wide range of 
policy tools (Claessens 2014; Darbar and Wu 2015); suggesting that the assessment 
and monitoring of risks emerging from the household sector may be in high 
demand from regulatory and supervisory bodies. Motivated by the rising interest 
from policy circles, we aim to assess the credit risk emerging from the household 
sector in relation to macroeconomic conditions.  
Various indicators and measures of household over-indebtedness or financial 
vulnerability have been discussed in recent studies (e.g., Bankowska et al. 2014; 
Bryan, Taylor, and Veliziotis 2010; Civic Consulting 2013; Disney, Bridges, and 
Gathergood 2008; D’Alessio and Iezzi 2014; Shubhasis 2008). We find that 
common indicators have been used in the form of debt levels (or debt servicing 
burdens) out of debt payment abilities, such as income, assets or consumption 
spending. For example, the ratios of debt to assets, debt to income, and debt service 
to income were used as indicators of household debt vulnerability by the ECB 
(2013) and in Costa and Farinha (2012) and Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2014). 
Other indicators have also been explored as an extension of these common 
indicators. These measures include information about the cash flow aspects of 
income-consumption-debt repayment streams or the asset-side liquidity of balance 
sheets as used to assess financial vulnerability, particularly in Albacete and Lindner 
(2013) and Ampudia et al. (2013), among others. In addition, self-reported 
household-level information about overdue debt, the number of credit 
commitments and financial difficulty has been used to measure the seriousness of 
debt problems. As concerns are raised about household debt in Korea, recent 
studies have assessed the vulnerability of Korean household debt based on 
household-level survey data. Several of those studies utilized indicators of financial 
vulnerability based on household survey data (e.g., Kim and Yoo 2013; Karasulu 
2008; Kim et al. 2014).  
Most of the earlier studies on household over-indebtedness or vulnerability are 
based on an analysis of household survey and self-reported data, which may be 
subject to errors or psychological biases while the data are released with significant 
time lags of a few years. In contrast to these previous studies, we use credit bureau 
(CB) data, which contain the actual credit activities and transactions recorded in 
most financial institutions and are used by financial institutions for the loan 
generation process. Based on the CB data, indicators of over-indebtedness are 
constructed for each borrower. The over-indebtedness indicators of interest in the 
current study are the credit score, the debt-service-to-income ratio (DSR), the DSR 
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of unsecured loan holders, the loan-to-income ratio (LTI), and the number of credit 
commitments. These indicators are studied for their properties and for their ability 
to predict defaults in the subsequent year. 
The aforementioned indicators may be used to identify the over-indebted or to 
study the associated vulnerability levels. Once the indicators of over-indebtedness 
are constructed, we then analyze who the overly indebted are in terms of their 
characteristics based on these indicators. There are several studies that analyzed the 
characteristics of the over-indebted based on household survey data (e.g., Bryan, 
Taylor, and Veliziotis 2010, Civic Consulting 2013; Disney, Bridges, and 
Gathergood 2008; D’Alessio and Iezzi 2014). Because survey data contains various 
details about households, the data may provide very useful information about the 
characteristics of the over-indebted. In comparison with survey data, CB data may 
provide a somewhat limited range of information about borrowers’ characteristics. 
Nevertheless, the CB data in the current study cover most individuals and financial 
institutions participating in the credit market in Korea and provide accurate 
information about the liability side of borrowers. It is also updated at a high 
frequency. 
We conduct stress tests on household debt to assess how the credit risk of the 
household sector would be affected at the aggregate level by adverse shocks to 
macroeconomic environments. We can find evidence in previous studies that 
macroeconomic conditions serve as determinants of the default risk of retail loans 
in banks’ portfolios, though they do not show how obligors may migrate in terms 
of certain aspects of the credit risk, such as credit ratings, in response to adverse 
shocks (e.g., Mayer et al. 2009; Agarwal and Liu 2003; Rinaldi and Sanchis-
Arellano 2006; Louzis et al. 2012; Büyükkarabacak and Valev 2010). We can also 
find studies on stress tests for an assessment of household debt vulnerability but 
based on household survey data (e.g., Kim and Yoo 2013; Karasulu 2008; Albacete 
and Fessler 2010; IMF 2012; Shubhasis, Djoudad, and Terajima 2008). These 
studies use information about cash flows and balance sheet positions to identify 
vulnerable households. They examine how the share of vulnerable households and 
their debt holdings change in response to fluctuations in macroeconomic 
conditions. In contrast, we use prominent indicators of debt vulnerability based on 
CB data and examine how the credit quality of borrowers would change if the 
macroeconomic environment changed dramatically. It should be noted that the 
stress tests using household survey data in previous studies may have limitations in 
timely credit risk assessments due to both insufficient information about borrowers’ 
default events and a few years of lags until their release. As concerns about 
household debt have increased in Korea, several recent Korean studies have used 
CB data to analyze its vulnerability (e.g., Hahm, Kim, and Lee 2010; Kim, Chang, 
and Choi 2012; Lee et al. 2014). However, these previous studies which rely on CB 
data ignored how macroeconomic conditions would affect the dominant predictors 
of defaults, instead focusing on indicators which only weakly predict defaults. It is 
also important to note that the current study sheds some light on how the 
relationship between the over-indebtedness measure and default rates would 
change in the face of adverse macroeconomic conditions. These features of the 
stress test conducted in the current study may enhance the risk assessments and 
monitoring of household credit risk at the aggregate and at the obligor level. 
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III. Data and Measures of Over-indebtedness 
 
We use data from the National Information and Credit Evaluation (NICE) CB to 
analyze the vulnerability of Korean household debt. The CB dataset contains actual 
credit activities from most financial institutions and covers most household loans in 
Korea.2 It contains information such as individual characteristics, debt contracts, 
delinquencies, types of lending institutions, and estimated incomes. We sample 
nearly one million individuals from the CB data in the analysis; hence, they are 
assumed to constitute a nationally representative random sample of individuals with 
credit records. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics pertaining to the sample data set, 
including the sample sizes, estimated incomes, ages, credit scores, debt amounts and 
DSR and LTI values. We note that high-income groups tend to have more borrowers 
with larger amounts of debt and debt service levels but better credit scores and lower 
default rates as well in comparison with other income groups. 
As a criterion to define over-indebtedness and to assess the financial vulnerability 
of debt holders, we use the likelihood that borrowers will not repay their debt or 
interest. In particular, the likelihood of being in arrears for more than 90 days during 
the subsequent year is used as a criterion to assess the extent of over-indebtedness. In 
other words, the more borrowers are exposed to default risks, the more they are 
considered to be overly indebted. We examine such indicators as the credit score, the 
DSR, the DSR of unsecured loan holders, the LTI, and the number of credit 
commitments, after which we assess their ability to predict defaults in the 
forthcoming year. 
Regarding the credit score, borrowers are divided into ten groups from the lowest 
to the highest credit quality based on the NICE credit scoring system. The debt 
service to income ratio (DSR) is computed as the debt-servicing burden out of 
income, estimated based on the CB data, as recommended by the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC). DSR ratios are also computed for unsecured loan 
holders. Loan to income ratios (LTI) are computed as the ratio of outstanding debt  
 
TABLE 1— DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE DATA (2014Q4) 
Note: a) Incomes in the table are on an annual basis. b) Default rates are the ratio of those who are not currently in 
default but experience a default within one year. 
 
2These encompass nearly every type of financial institution operating in Korea, including domestic banks, 
branches of foreign banks, securities companies, insurance companies, savings banks, credit card leasing and 
finance companies, agricultural and fisheries cooperatives credit unions, and community credit cooperatives. 
Income quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Sample size (No. of individuals) 156,332 247,279 209,873 193,111 188,742 995,337 
Median age 32 38 45 47 49 45 
Average estimated income (\10,000) a) 1,308 2,174 2,940 3,700 5,438 3,114 
Median credit score 5 5 4 2 2 4 
Default rates (%) b) 3.5 3.7 3.3 2.7 1.4 2.7 
Share of borrowers (%) 32 24 40 54 69 43 
Average debt of borrowers (\10,000) 2,710 3,850 4,090 5,268 11,290 6,367 
Median DSR of borrowers (%) 20 21 19 19 26 22 
Median LTI of borrowers (%) 66 65 61 64 109 74 
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FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWERS BY OVER-INDEBTEDNESS INDICATORS 
 
out of the estimated individual incomes. The number of credit commitments refers 
to how many financial institutions each borrower is indebted to at the moment.  
Based on the indicators of over-indebtedness, we note how borrowers are 
distributed on the spectrum of each measure, as shown in Figure 3. Regarding the 
credit score, nearly 70% of borrowers are rated at equal to and above the fifth 
credit score, while the remaining 30% of borrowers are rated equal to or below the 
sixth credit score. We also find that the share of borrowers in each group of credit 
scores decreases as credit scores deteriorate for the remaining 30% of borrowers. 
Regarding the DSR, approximately 70% of borrowers have DSRs below 40%, 
while the remaining 30% have DSRs higher than 40%. We also observe that the 
number of borrowers decreases as the DSR increases. With respect to the DSR of 
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unsecured debt holders, about 80% of borrowers with unsecured loans have DSRs 
below 30%, with the remaining 20% having DSRs higher than 30%. Again, the 
share of borrowers with unsecured loans decreases as their DSR increases. 
Regarding the LTI, nearly 80% of borrowers have LTIs lower than 200%, and the 
number of borrowers decreases as the LTI increases. Approximately 80% of 
borrowers have loans from less than or equal to two financial institutions while the 
remaining 20% of borrowers have loans from more than or equal to three financial 
institutions. 
 
IV. Over-indebtedness and the Likelihood of Default 
 
We analyze how over-indebtedness indicators are related to default rates in the 
near-term future in order to assess how well they reflect borrowers’ default risk. 
Indicators that show a strong and clear relationship with the default rate in the 
forthcoming year may be preferred over indicators that do not show such a 
relationship. In addition, an indicator of over-indebtedness can be compared with 
other indicators in terms of their ability to predict a default. In the current study, a 
state of default is defined as being in arrears for more than 90 days. By computing 
the frequency of defaults in the forthcoming year corresponding to different values 
of over-indebtedness, we can quantify the relationship between the over-
indebtedness indicators and the rates of default in the subsequent year. We assess 
over-indebtedness indicators such as the credit score, the DSR, the DSR of 
unsecured debt holders, the LTI, and the number of credit commitments for their 
association with default rates in the forthcoming year.  
In the following, we analyze how well the over-indebtedness indicators predict 
the frequency of defaults in the subsequent year.3 Borrowers credit-rated from the 
sixth to the tenth levels show higher than average default rates in the forthcoming 
year, as shown in Figure 4, while borrowers credit-rated from the eighth to the 
tenth record default rates above 20%, much higher than the average default rate. 
Borrowers with DSRs above 40% record default rates in the subsequent year higher 
than average, as shown in Figure 4. The default rates of borrowers tend to increase 
very slowly as the DSR increases. Changes in the DSR do not significantly 
influence changes in default rates in the subsequent year. In fact, the association 
between changes in default rates and changes in the DSR appear much weaker as 
compared to the credit score. With respect to the DSR of unsecured loan holders, 
those with DSRs higher than 30% record default rates in the forthcoming year 
higher than average, as shown in Figure 4. However, the overall pattern of default 
rates associated with the DSR of unsecured loan holders is similar to that of the 
general indebted. Regarding the LTI, borrowers with LTIs above 600–700% record 
default rates in the next year higher than average, as shown in Figure 4. The default 
rates of borrowers tend to increase very slowly in the LTI range above 300–400% 
as the LTI increases. However, changes in the LTI do not appear to show a 
significant association with changes in default rates in the subsequent year.  
 
3The frequency of defaults within the subsequent year is computed as the ratio of those who are not currently 
in default but experience a default within the next one year.  
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FIGURE 4. OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND DEFAULT RATES IN THE FORTHCOMING YEAR 
 
For instance, default rates do not change much in the LTI range up to 700%, as 
shown in Figure 4. Multiple credit commitments are shown to be strongly 
associated with default rates in the near future. Borrowers with loans from up to 
two financial institutions show default rates lower than or similar to the average in 
the subsequent year, as depicted in Figure 4. However, their default rates become 
higher than average if the number of credit commitments reaches three. Default 
rates become much higher than average for borrowers with loans from four or more 
financial institutions. Thus, the number of credit commitments may serve as a 
useful predictor of default in the near future. 
The credit risk of borrowers may be better characterized by a combination of 
over-indebtedness indicators than by a single indicator. Thus, it may be valuable to 
analyze how borrowers are distributed and how are associated with default rates in  
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FIGURE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWERS IN MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 
  
multiple dimensions of the over-indebtedness indicators. With respect to the 
multidimensionality of both credit scores and credit commitments, a large share of 
borrowers can be found among those with relatively better credit scores and fewer 
credit commitments, as shown in Figure 5. With respect to the multidimensionality 
of both credit scores and DSRs, more borrowers exist in a region of relatively 
better credit scores and lower DSRs, as shown in Figure 5. Regarding the 
multidimensionality of both DSRs and the number of credit commitments, a large 
proportion of borrowers are found among those with fewer credit commitments and 
relatively lower DSRs. 
The likelihood of defaults may also be evaluated in multiple dimensions 
combining multiple indicators of over-indebtedness. The default rates in the 
forthcoming year appear most strongly associated with the credit score out of the 
indicators of the credit score, the DSR, and the number of credit commitments, as 
shown in Figure 6. If the DSR and the number of credit commitments are 
compared with regard to their ability to predict default, the number of credit 
commitments is more strongly associated with the default rate. Note that the 
number of credit commitments may still contain some explanatory power for 
defaults in the near future, even with credit scores controlled, as shown in Figure 6. 
In contrast, the DSR does not show a clear pattern in relation to default rates if the 
credit scores are fixed, as shown in Figure 6. In short, the credit score can be used 
as a dominant predictor of the default rates in the forthcoming year, while the 
number of credit commitments has some additional explanatory power with regard 
to default rates even when credit scores are taken into account. 
1
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FIGURE 6. DEFAULT RATES IN IN MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 
 
Thus, the credit score may be the dominant predictor of default in the 
forthcoming year, while the number of credit commitments may have some 
additional predictability. The DSR may carry some information about default risk; 
however, it loses its explanatory power to predict a default in the near future if 
better predictors such as the credit score and the number of credit commitments are 
taken into account. Table 2 shows how the over-indebtedness indicators are 
correlated with one another. Credit scores show a positive association with the 
number of credit commitments, implying that borrowers with poorer credit rates 
tend to borrow from a larger number of financial institutions. Meanwhile, the debt 
burden ratio indicators of the DSR and LTI are not clearly related to credit scores, 
whereas they are weakly and positively correlated with the number of credit 
commitments. In other words, the amount of debt or the debt service burden 
relative to income may not necessarily provide information about their credit score, 
whereas higher debt-burden ratios in terms of the DSR and LTI are positively 
associated with the number of credit commitments. The DSR and LTI are highly 
correlated with each other, implying that the information delivered by the 
respective indicators may overlap somewhat. 
We estimate simple logistic regression models in order to assess the 
predictability of the over-indebtedness indicators for defaults in the forthcoming 
year. The regression results from (1) to (4) in Table 3 show that all indicators are 
statistically significant, although the suitability of each indicator differs 
significantly from one another. Regression (1) shows that the credit score alone has  
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TABLE 2—CORRELATIONS AMONG OVER-INDEBTEDNESS INDICATORS (2014Q4) 
Correlations Credit score DSR LTI No. of loans 
Credit score 1    
DSR 0.0249 1   
LTI -0.0431 0.9071 1  
No. of loans 0.3676 0.1195 0.1281 1 
Note: p-values of all correlation coefficients are less than 0.0001.  
 
TABLE 3—LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS (2013Q4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Credit score 0.4503 
(0.0040)    
0.4053 
(0.0045) 
DSR  0.0006 (0.0001)   
0.0017 
(0.0002) 
LTI   0.0001 (0.0000)  
-0.0006 
(0.0001) 
No. of loans    0.3814 (0.0041) 
0.2108 
(0.0045) 
Constant -5.9231  
(0.0040) 
-3.5642 
(0.0062) 
-3.5239 
(0.0098) 
-4.3657 
(0.0148) 
-6.1620 
(0.0295) 
No. of obs. 420,619 405,313 413,364 413,209 405,253 
C-statistic 0.823 0.548 0.504 0.687 0.844 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
excellent predictability with regard to a default in the subsequent year according to 
the C-statistic (above 0.8).4 The regression results of (2) and (3) show that the 
DSR or LTI may not be useful predictors by themselves according to the C-statistic 
(close to 0.5), while LTI is virtually uninformative about forthcoming default 
events. In addition, the LTI coefficient estimate is even unstable across prediction 
models, as depicted by (3) in comparison with (5), for example. Regression (4) 
indicates that multiple credit commitments show good predictability of defaults, 
although the predictability is weaker than that of the credit score. Regression (5), 
including all of the indicators, shows improved predictability compared to all other 
regression models, though it is only slightly better than model (1). In short, we find 
that the credit score is the dominant predictor of default in the near future. 
Including additional over-indebtedness indicators such as the number of credit 
commitments and the DSR and LTI in the regression specification may improve the 
predictability, but only slightly. We also find that the regression results appear 
consistent with the pattern of default rates, as shown above in the various dimensions 
of the over-indebtedness indicators. It should be noted that the assessment of the 
indicators is for their short-term (one year) predictability of defaults. The 
predictability of DSR and LTI, which are considered to reflect fundamental 
repayment capability of debtors, may improve over a longer time horizon. 
 
  
 
4The C-statistic can be used to evaluate model predictability. It ranges from 0.5 to 1. If the C-statistic is close 
to 0.5, the model is interpreted as not useful for predictions.  
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V. Characteristics of the Over-indebted 
 
It is important to understand who the overly indebted are in order to design 
policies to deal with household debt problems. The findings above demonstrate that 
the over-indebtedness indicators can predict near-term defaults but with different 
strengths of predictability. Credit scores are strong in terms of their ability to 
predict defaults, while the number of credit commitments and DSR may provide 
some additional information on the likelihood of a default. Below, we analyze how 
the over-indebted in terms of the credit score, the multiple credit commitments and 
the DSR are characterized in comparison with average borrowers. Over-indebted 
borrowers are analyzed on several metrics, including their age, income, debt level, 
geographical residence area, lending institutions, and on other metrics relevant to 
the overly indebted. 
First, borrowers with poor credit ratings are compared with borrowers with 
better credit ratings and with average borrowers, as shown in Table 4. There does 
not appear to be a significant difference in age between borrowers in the different 
credit ratings groups. Borrowers rated below the seventh credit score represent 
about 19% of all borrowers. They tend to have smaller income and debt levels than 
those with better credit ratings. Their residences are generally equally distributed 
between the capital area and other regions, while borrowers with better credit 
ratings are concentrated somewhat more in the capital area than in other regions.  
 
TABLE 4—CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OVER-INDEBTED BY  
CREDIT SCORE, NO. OF LOANS, AND DSR (2013Q4)5 
Borrower characteristics 
Credit score No. of 
loans DSR TO- 
TAL 1st–6th 
ratings 
7th–10th 
ratings < 3 >=3 
< 
60% 
>= 
60% 
Median age 46 45 46 44 45 49 46 
Share of borrowers (%) 81 19 81 19 84 16 100 
Average income relative to the total (%) 104 82 99 104 99 107 100 
Average debt relative to the total (%) 108 65 86 161 54 341 100 
Income quintile (by median income) 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Share of borrowers in Capital (%) 53 51 52 55 53 52 52 
Non-capital (%) 47 49 48 45 47 48 48 
Share of borrowers from Only banks (%) 49 12 50 8 45 24 42 
Only non-banks (%) 33 66 40 34 39 39 39 
Both banks and non-banks (%) 19 22 10 59 16 37 19 
Average number of loans 1.8 2.6 1.3 4.1 1.7 2.5 1.8 
Median credit score 3 8 3 6 4 4 4 
Median DSR (%) 21.9 16.9 17.5 43.7 16.4 94.4 21.1 
Median LTI (%) 77. 5 46.1 58.2 134.2 52.7 386.3 70.7 
 
 
5The cut-off levels for over-indebtedness in the above analysis are the seventh rating for the credit score, 3 for 
the number of credit commitments, and 60% for the DSR. Those with a credit score equal to or less than the 
seventh credit rating tend to record high default rates, while they may have difficulty to obtain an unsecured loan 
from a bank. Those with loans from three or more financial institutions are often categorized as ‘borrowers with 
multiple credit commitments’ and tend to show high default rates, as shown in Figure 4. The DSR is related to 
default rates, but it may not be as good a predictor as the credit score or the number of loans. Nevertheless, DSR 
may represent potential risk on a longer time horizon, while those with high DSRs beyond 50-60% may have 
difficulty obtaining a mortgage. 
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Nearly two thirds of borrowers with low credit ratings borrow only from non-bank 
financial institutions, while 12% of them borrow only from banks. In contrast, 
about half of borrowers with better credit ratings borrow only from banks, while 
one third of them borrow only from non-bank financial institutions. Borrowers with 
low credit ratings tend to have more credit commitments than those with better 
credit ratings. Nevertheless, they show much lower DSRs and LTIs than those with 
better credit ratings due to their much smaller debt amounts. 
Second, borrowers with multiple credit commitments are compared with those 
who have fewer credit commitments in Table 4. There appears to be a trivial 
difference in age between those with more credit commitments and those with 
fewer. Borrowers with three or more credit commitments represent nearly 19% of 
all borrowers. They tend to have levels of income similar to that of the average 
borrower but much higher levels of debt than the average borrower. Thus, their 
DSRs and LTIs are much higher than average. They are concentrated slightly more 
in the capital area than in other regions. They show a very high dependence on 
non-bank financial institutions in comparison with the average borrower; 34% of 
them borrow only from non-bank financial institutions and 59% of them borrow 
from both banks and non-bank financial institutions. Borrowers with multiple loans 
tend to have worse credit ratings compared to the average borrower. 
Third, borrowers with heavier debt burdens in terms of the DSR are compared 
with borrowers with lighter debt burdens in Table 4. Borrowers with heavier debt 
burdens are four years older than those with less debt. Borrowers with DSRs above 
60% comprise approximately 16% of all borrowers. They tend to have levels of 
income similar to that of the average borrower but a much higher level of debt. 
Thus, their DSRs and LTIs are much higher than average, even multiple times 
higher. Their residences are distributed slightly more in the capital area than in 
other regions. There does not appear to be a significant difference in terms of 
residential region between borrowers with a high DSR and the average borrower. 
High-DSR borrowers show high dependence on non-bank financial institutions 
when they borrow. It was found that 39% of them borrow only from non-banks and 
37% of them borrow from both banks and non-banks. In addition, they tend to 
borrow from more financial institutions. Nevertheless, they do not show a 
significant difference in terms of their credit scores when compared with those less 
burdened with debt, indicating that high-DSR borrowers may not necessarily be 
riskier than the average borrower according to their credit scores. 
We have documented the characteristics of the over-indebted to shed light on 
who the over-indebted are and how they differ from average borrowers in several 
dimensions. We find that most over-indebtedness indicators recount the common 
characteristics of the over-indebted. For example, over-indebted borrowers tend to 
depend heavily on non-bank financial institutions as sources of their loans. In 
addition, those classified as overly indebted in terms of one indicator tend to be 
classified as overly indebted by other indicators as well. However, it is important to 
note that different indicators appear to elucidate the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
the over-indebted. For instance, the over-indebted with poor credit scores tend to 
have lower DSRs than average, while the over-indebted with multiple credit 
commitments have much higher DSRs than average. Thus, special caution needs to 
be exercised regarding the appropriate use of over-indebtedness indicators for 
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financial supervision or risk-monitoring purposes. 
 
VI. Financial Vulnerability of the Indebted: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We are often asked about how adverse shocks to the economy would affect the 
amount of credit risks to which borrowers are exposed at the aggregate level, which 
would then affect the soundness of financial institutions with the risky loans in 
their asset portfolios. In order to answer this question, we may conduct stress tests, 
which may be a useful tool for assessing financial vulnerability from a forward-
looking perspective. By relating the degree of over-indebtedness to the probability 
of default ( ),PD  we may be able to compute borrowers’ exposure to default risk 
at the aggregate level and analyze how they are expected to change in response to 
shifts in the macroeconomic environment. For example, we may compute the 
frequency of defaults associated with each credit score ( );iCS  hence, borrower 
i ’s credit score ( )iCS  can indicate his/her probability of default ( ).iPD  If each 
borrower i were assigned a probability of default (ܲܦ௜) based on the relationship 
between their over-indebtedness and its corresponding default rates, the average 
likelihood of default would then be computed by ( ) / ,i iPD N  where N is the 
total number of borrowers. This expression indicates that the aggregate credit risk 
would increase if more borrowers were associated with higher probabilities of 
default. To assess the financial vulnerability of the indebted, we conduct the 
following stress test. First, stress scenarios reflecting macroeconomic distress are 
juxtaposed against baseline scenario. Stress scenarios may reflect hypothetical 
changes in macroeconomic environments (e.g., the GDP, interest rates, and asset 
prices, among others). They may be based on specific historical events (e.g., the 
Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis) or on a distribution of 
macroeconomic variables of interest. Next, a shift in macroeconomic conditions 
changes the distribution of borrowers in terms of over-indebtedness. Because over-
indebtedness is associated with the probability of default, the distributional change 
in the over-indebtedness dimension would reassign a new probability of default 
( )iPD  to each borrower i . The new iPD  reassigned to each borrower i  may 
allow us to predict the average default rates under the stress scenario.6 If more 
borrowers were associated with more over-indebtedness, the share of borrowers 
exposed to higher levels of credit risk would then increase. In short, a shift in 
macroeconomic conditions may affect the aggregate credit risk in terms of the 
average probability of default by changing the distribution of borrowers in terms of 
over-indebtedness. 
Because the credit score is the dominant predictor of default in the near future 
among the over-indebtedness indicators discussed above, we analyze below how 
the distribution of borrowers would change in the credit score dimension if the  
 
 
6In turn, we may assess how much bank assets are exposed to the default level of risk, although we do not 
assess the impact on the soundness of bank assets in this paper. That is, the change in borrowers’ credit risk would 
affect the balance sheets of the banking sector in terms of exposure at default (EAD) and expected loss (EL). 
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FIGURE 7. ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREDIT SCORES AND RISK AMOUNTS 
 
economy were hit by an adverse macroeconomic shock.7 Suppose that the credit 
score is related to the amount of risk in a straight-line relationship, as depicted in 
Figure 7, where the risk amount may be measured by      ,1 /ln odds ln p p   
where p denotes the borrower default rate. Macroeconomic distress may change the 
relationship between the credit score and the risk amount (RA). We may decompose 
the change in the relationship into a change in the intercept and a change in the 
slope. Figure 7 shows how the change in the relationship from (1) to (2) may be 
decomposed into the intercept change and the slope change. A change in the 
intercept may reflect equal changes in the amount of risk at each credit score, while 
a change in the slope may reflect unequal changes in the amount of risk across 
different credit scores - see Capuzzo (2011) for a conceptual discussion and some 
applications. We may capture the change in the relationship by changes in credit 
scores in order to keep each credit score associated with a certain amount of risk. In 
other words, macroeconomic distress would change the distribution of borrowers in 
the credit score dimension, i.e., credit migration, if we would like to keep default 
rates associated with each credit score fixed. 
The baseline scenario and the stress scenario are denoted here as 0t  and ,t   
respectively. The relationship between the credit score ( )CS  and   ln odds  
under the baseline scenario 0( )t  may be written as   0 0 00n ,l t t ttodds CS    
while the relationship between the credit score ( )CS  and   ln odds  under the stress 
scenario ( )t  may be written by   .ln t t ttodds CS    If the macroeconomic 
environment shifted from the baseline to the stress scenario, the relationship 
between the credit score ( )CS  and   ln odds  would change and could then be 
represented by a change in t t0α ( α α )α    and a change in 0( ).t t        
Because we would like to keep the risk amount associated with each credit score 
fixed, the change in the risk amount should be captured by the risk-equivalent 
change in the credit scores. We can compute the risk-preserving credit score change 
 
7Note that the credit score alone is similar in terms of predictability to the prediction model including all the 
indicators together, as shown in Table 3. 
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0( )CS t tCS CS   by solving 0 0 0 0( .)t t t t t tCS CS CS         This equation 
can be rearranged for ,CS  which can be expressed in terms of   and   
as shown below.  
 
(1)    0/ /t t tCS CS         
 
This equation can also be written as  0 0 0/ /t t t t tCS CS       to show how 
the credit score at ( )tt CS  is related to the risk-equivalent credit score at 0t   
0( ).tCS  Equation (1) indicates how changes in the intercept ( )  and in the 
slope ( )  may lead to changes in credit scores ( ).CS  
If t  and t  were given as functions of the macroeconomic variables ( ),tX   
i.e., ( )tF X  and ),( tF X  respectively, the shift in the macroeconomic condition 
would then change the credit score according to equation (1). In order to compute 
the change in the credit score, t  and t  may need to be estimated as functions 
of the macroeconomic variables ( ).tX  Note that ).( tF X  and ( )tF X  can be 
estimated for mortgage borrowers and other borrowers separately in order to take 
differences in risk characteristics into account. Figure 8 shows the time series of 
t  and t  for mortgage borrowers. In this paper, t  and t  are estimated as 
functions of macroeconomic conditions ( )tX  consisting of the misery index 
(unemployment rate + inflation rate - GDP growth rate), corporate bond yields, and 
stock returns, among other factors.8 Below are the estimated models for t  and 
t  for mortgage borrowers.9  
  
      14 7 40.01758 0.0616 int 0.341t t t tur cpi gdp s stock          
 5.3948 0.276 dummy  10 
 
     70.00003514 0.00003462t ttrend ur cpi gdp       
  120.000056 int 0.0095ts   11 
 
According to the estimation results of ,t  the misery index and interest rates tend 
to decrease   ln odds  while stock returns tend to increase   ln ,odds consistent 
with our sense of the credit risk, noting that   ln odds  is inversely related to the 
level of default risk. 
 
8Similar macroeconomic variables have been used to explain default rates of retail loans in BOKST-07, one of 
stress test models of the Bank of Korea – see Moon (2008) for details. 
9In the estimation models, ur, cpi, gdp, ints, and stock denote unemployment rates, CPI inflation rates, GDP 
growth rates, interest rates (nominal), and stock returns (nominal) at a monthly frequency, respectively. GDP 
growth rates at a monthly frequency are computed by interpolating the quarterly GDP growth rates. 
10Rଶ=0.48. The model includes a dummy variable to reflect the upgrade of the credit scoring system at 2010.  
11Rଶ=0.92 
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FIGURE 8. INTERCEPT ( )  AND SLOPE ( )  OF  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  ln odds  AND CREDIT SCORE 
 
If t  and t  were given as estimated functions of the macroeconomic 
variables, respectively, the change in the macroeconomic condition 0( )t tX X   
would then bring about changes in the credit score 0( )t tCS CS  according to 
equation (1). As each borrower’s credit score changes, the distribution of borrowers 
in terms of their credit scores would then change. If borrowers were redistributed in 
this credit score dimension, each borrower i would be reassigned a new   
, )( i tPD PD  corresponding to their new credit score ,( ).i tCS  We can then compute 
the average PD  under the stress scenario by ,( ) / ,i i tPD N  as discussed above. 
In short, we may be able to predict how the distribution of borrowers would change 
in terms of the credit score and how the aggregate default risk would change in 
terms of the average PD  if macroeconomic conditions worsened. 
We show the stress test results for the aggregate credit risk below while 
assuming a reoccurrence of historical events, such as past financial crises. The 
stress scenarios of interest may be macroeconomic conditions during the period of 
past crises such as the Asian financial crisis of 1998-99 (AFC) and the recent 
global financial crisis of 2008-09 (GFC).12 Figure 9 shows how the distribution of 
borrowers would change in terms of the credit score dimension against the baseline 
scenario if each historical stress scenario reoccurred. We find that macroeconomic 
distress would redistribute borrowers from better credit scores to worse credit 
scores. It was also found that more migration would occur from the upper to the 
middle credit score range while less migration would occur from the middle to the 
lower credit score range. In addition, the impact of stress scenarios on the credit 
migration would be much stronger for the case of the Asian financial crisis, the 
relatively worse macroeconomic condition. As borrowers migrate into credit score 
regions of higher default probability ( PD ) levels, the overall credit risk is expected 
to increase. Figure 9 shows that the aggregate credit risk in terms of the average  
 
12As stress scenarios, the GDP growth (%), unemployment (%), inflation (%), KOSPI returns (%) and 3yr. 
corporate bond yield change (%p) are assumed to be -0.5, 4.7, 6, -21 and 7.8 for the AFC, and 1.4, 3.3, 4.3, -32 
and 1.2 for the GFC, respectively. The historical stress scenarios correspond to the periods that maximize the PD. 
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FIGURE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWERS AND AVERAGE PD BY STRESS SCENARIOS 
 
PD  would increase if macroeconomic conditions shifted from the baseline to each 
historical stress scenario of the past crises. 
It is important to note that the stress test proposed in the current study utilizes 
the dominant predictor of default as an intermediary channel through which 
macroeconomic conditions affect the aggregate default rates. In the current stress 
test model, macroeconomic shocks affect the aggregate credit risk level by 
changing the distribution of borrowers in terms of their credit scores, which is 
strongly associated with default rates. In addition, we take into account the impact 
of macroeconomic fluctuations on the relationship between the over-indebtedness 
indicator and default rates. These features of the current stress test are distinct from 
those in previous studies that also used CB data but that utilized DSRs or LTVs as 
main variables in the intermediary channels, which are weakly associated with 
default rates, as noted in Table 3.13 Changes in such indicators as the DSR, LTI, or 
LTV may only partially explain the movement of default rates, as also noted by 
Kim and Byun (2010) and Choi and Park (2015), among others. In addition, the 
relationship between such over-indebtedness indicators and subsequent defaults 
was often assumed to be constant in earlier work, thus resulting in little change in 
the default rate even against severely depressed macroeconomic scenarios. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The current study assesses the vulnerability of household debt based on an 
analysis of obligor-level information from CB data. We construct over-
indebtedness indicators from the CB data and assess their capability to predict 
defaults in the near future. Based on the over-indebtedness indicators, we show 
how borrowers are distributed in terms of over-indebtedness and how the over-
indebted differ from average borrowers in terms of their characteristics. 
Furthermore, we conduct a stress test on household debt to assess the vulnerability 
 
13See Hahm, Kim, and Lee (2010); Kim, Chang, and Choi (2012); and Lee, Jun, Chung, and Byun (2014) for 
related previous studies which use CB data.  
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of borrowers and show how the aggregate credit risk would change under severe 
macroeconomic distress such as that which occurred in past financial crises (the 
global financial crisis and the Asian financial crisis).  
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 has shown us that the rising risk from 
burgeoning household debt in association with real estate bubbles could damage 
the financial stability with large disruptions to the real economy and lead therefore 
to extensive reforms on financial regulation and supervision afterwards. In order to 
implement effective policies for financial stability, the collection of information 
and the monitoring of emerging risks have been strongly emphasized, as discussed 
above. The findings of this paper may contribute to this end by providing practical 
guidance for assessing the vulnerability associated with the burgeoning household 
debt, which is a notable risk factor challenging the financial stability of Korea. It  
is also important to note that the CB data used in the current study cover most 
individuals and financial institutions in Korea and are updated at a high frequency, 
thus allowing for timely assessments of credit risks. The stress test conducted  
based on the CB data allows us to assess the household credit risk at the aggregate 
level while showing us how the distribution of obligors in terms of the credit risk 
(ratings) dimension would change in response to adverse shocks. This 
distributional feature of the risk assessment measure may also help financial 
institutions with the retail loans in their portfolios for their risk management 
practices. 
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